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Essay
On the Abuse and Limits of Lawyer Discipline
VINCENT R. JOHNSON
Despite being routinely underfunded, lawyer disciplinary processes
must operate in ways that merit the confidence of both society at large and
the American legal profession. This means that those who participate in
lawyer grievance adjudication must be vigilant against systemic abuse
(whether deliberate or unintentional) and mindful of factors that limit
institutional competence. This Essay argues that, in many instances,
disciplinary authorities should abstain from deciding grievances that
would require them to rule on unresolved scientific questions, particularly
if controversial matters are involved. The Essay further urges that
grievance rulings must be consistent with American constitutional
principles which favor robust debate of public issues and hold that even
unpopular parties have a right to legal counsel. A lawyer should never be
subject to discipline based on allegedly misleading advertising absent
persuasive evidence that the lawyer knowingly, recklessly, or negligently
made a provably false assertion of fact.
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On the Abuse and Limits of Lawyer Discipline
VINCENT R. JOHNSON*
At what point does filing a grievance amount to an abuse of lawyer
disciplinary processes? And even if there is no abuse, when does a
disciplinary authority lack competence to adjudicate a complaint? Is the
necessity of ruling on a disputed scientific question the type of quandary
that, in some cases, makes it impossible for a grievance authority to decide
allegations of misconduct?
In October 2011, a Charlotte School of Law professor filed a
complaint with the District of Columbia Office of Bar Counsel against four
lawyers with Crowell & Moring LLP (“the lawyers”).1 The complaint
accused the lawyers of publishing a misleading advertisement.2
The backdrop for this accusation was the ongoing legal and social
battle between Big Coal and environmentalists.3 The precipitating cause
for the complaint was the fact that eight days after a peer-reviewed medical
study linked birth defects to the environmental devastation caused by
mountaintop mining, the lawyers ran an advertisement on their website. 4
The advertisement stated, among other things, that “[t]he study failed to
account for consanquinity [sic], one of the most prominent sources of birth
defects.”5
The advertisement provoked a firestorm of criticism on the ground that
it demeaned the people of Appalachia by perpetuating stereotypes of
inbreeding.6 In response, the lawyers removed the offending language, and
*
Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University, San Antonio, Texas. LL.M., Yale University; J.D.,
University of Notre Dame; B.A., LL.D., St. Vincent College.
1
Memorandum from Jason Huber to the Office of Bar Counsel, Board on Professional
Responsibility, District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Oct. 4, 2011), available at
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/files/huber-ethics-complaint-re-crowell.pdf [hereinafter Complaint]; see
also Brian Baxter, Crowell Hit with Ethics Complaint over Inbreeding Comment, AM. LAW DAILY
(Oct. 6, 2011, 2:24 PM), http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2011/10/crowell-ethicscomplaint.html; Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof Files Ethics Complaint Against Crowell Lawyers for
Appalachian
Inbreeding
Suggestion,
A.B.A.
J.
(Oct.
7,
2011,
8:35
AM)
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/law_prof_files_ethics_complaint_against_crowell_lawyers_fo
r_appalachian_inb/.
2
Complaint, supra note 1, at 1–2.
3
See id. at 2–5 (discussing the tension between the mountaintop mining company and the
scientists who published the study).
4
Id. at 3–4.
5
Id. at exhibit B.
6
See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Did Crowell & Moring Insult Appalachians with Inbreeding
Suggestion?,
A.B.A.
J.
(Jul.
12,
2011,
7:06
AM),
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apologized for “any offense taken.”
In the D.C. complaint, the professor alleged that the lawyers
7

failed to recognize decades old empirical research that
established that consanguinity is no more prevalent in
Appalachia than anywhere else in the country. Controlling
for inbreeding is therefore not necessary. Thus, due to a
lack of proper context and support for the Authors’
consanguinity comment, the Advertisement as a whole
was materially misleading and violated Rule 7.1(a) and
Rule 8.4(c).8
Seemingly the only way that disciplinary authorities could rule on this
complaint was by making factual findings about whether inbreeding is
disproportionately prevalent in Appalachia or about whether consanguinity
causes most birth defects. Indeed, that may have been the purpose of the
complaint—a desire to build favorable precedent on factual issues
important to the victims of mountaintop mining. However, inasmuch as
the reasoning of disciplinary authorities rarely becomes public, the
complaint may have been filed simply to discourage lawyers from
representing coal operators or to penalize them for seeking to do so.
Lawyer disciplinary authorities generally have little or no expertise on
scientific questions like the prevalence of inbreeding or the causes of birth
defects. It is therefore questionable whether the all-too-limited financial
and human resources available for policing the legal profession should be
spent on this kind of dispute. These types of issues are far removed from
the run-of-the-mill cases where lawyers are disciplined under the
advertising rules for misleading statements about fees,9 credentials,10

http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/did_crowell_moring_insult_appalachians_with_inbreeding_su
ggestion/ (discussing the local media reaction and the law firm’s attempt to distance itself from the
offensive statements).
7
Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
8
Id. at 8; see D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1(a) (2011) (“A lawyer shall not make a false
or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services. A communication is false or
misleading if it: (1) Contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or omits a fact necessary to
make the statement considered as a whole not materially misleading . . . .”); id. R. 8.4 (“It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to: . . . (c) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation . . . .”). These rules are substantially identical to similarly numbered provisions in
the American Bar Association’s Model Rules. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 & 8.4
(2011).
9
See, e.g., In re Pacior, 770 N.E.2d 273, 274 (Ind. 2002) (per curiam) (imposing discipline based
on misleading statements about free initial consultation).
10
See, e.g., N.C. State Bar v. Culbertson, 627 S.E.2d 644, 649 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding
that a lawyer’s statement that he was “published” in the Federal Reports was misleading).
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experience, or foreign language abilities.
Whether mountaintop mining causes birth defects or other adverse
health consequences is a matter of great public concern.13 That is why the
merits of resulting legal claims should be fully aired. For decades, the
Supreme Court has recognized that there is a “profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”14 This means that lawyers and their
clients should not be discouraged from raising colorable issues related to
questions of legal responsibility. Unfortunately, the filing of a disciplinary
complaint against lawyers who are willing to make the case of unpopular
clients threatens to truncate public discussion of important social issues
and chill the exercise of First Amendment rights.
The argument behind the D.C. complaint seems to be that the topic of
consanguinity (at least in Appalachia) is beyond the range of legitimate
debate because a study of marital records thirty years ago concluded that
inbreeding was not “unique or particularly common to” Southern
Appalachia.15 Yet, lawyer grievance committees have limited fact-finding
powers and procedures. Surely, such a body should not be the tribunal to
rule on whether a previous scientific study was so definitive as to forbid,
on grounds of misrepresentation, arguments related to consanguinity in
cases seeking to hold coal companies responsible for the health-related
consequences of their actions.
Not every difference of opinion amounts to a misrepresentation. The
fact that one lawyer has disregarded a fact that another lawyer thinks is
important, and has raised an issue that the other believes lacks merit, does
not necessarily mean that the first lawyer has misrepresented the evidence.
Rather, the divergence of perspectives may simply mean that the facts are
sufficiently complex that there is support for differing views.
Of course, a point may come where the facts are so clear or
overwhelmingly established that to deny them is to perpetrate a fraud.
This might be true today if a lawyer places an advertisement stating, as a
matter of fact, that smoking tobacco does not cause lung cancer. However,
as a general matter, disciplinary tribunals should be wary of declaring that
11
See, e.g., In re Huelskamp, 740 N.E.2d 846, 848 (Ind. 2000) (per curiam) (involving misleading
statements about military and teaching experience).
12
See, e.g., In re Wells, 709 S.E.2d 644, 646–47 (S.C. 2011) (per curiam) (holding that “We
Speak Spanish” was misleading on the facts of the case).
13
See Clara Bingham, A Call to Arms: Citizens Need to Save Appalachia, COURIER-JOURNAL
(Louisville, Ky.), July 10, 2011, at H1 (arguing that mountaintop removal coal mining results in
increased cancer rates and higher costs to treat illnesses); Ivy Brashear, Editorial, Readers Forum;
Community Challenge; Mountaintop Mining Poses Threat to Health, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville,
Ky.), July 25, 2011, at A6 (urging citizens of Eastern Kentucky to fight against mountaintop removal
coal mining).
14
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
15
Complaint, supra note 1, at 42 exhibit G.
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there is no room for disagreement on scientific questions.
It would be dangerous for disciplinary authorities to allow grievances
to be used as tactical weapons for advancement of partisan purposes
ancillary to civil litigation. This is particularly true inasmuch as most
states hold that the filing of a grievance against a lawyer is absolutely
privileged.16 Preventing the actual or apparent abuse of the lawyer
disciplinary process is one reason why, even though there is a mandatory
duty to report misconduct by another lawyer,17 it is generally agreed that
reporting may be deferred until the conclusion of pending litigation from
which knowledge of the misconduct emerged.18
Courts and ethics advisory committees often wisely decline to rule on
political questions because those matters are more properly within the
purview of other branches of government.19 So too, it may be prudent for
disciplinary authorities to avoid adjudicating unsettled scientific
controversies, which are better resolved in the courts. Such a choice might
be justified on the ground that the unresolved state of the relevant science
means that the grievance is not ripe for adjudication.
A decision not to rule promptly on a complaint identifying alleged
lawyer misconduct would not be unprecedented.
“[D]isciplinary
authorities often suspend or abate their own inquiry [into a grievance
involving the same conduct as a pending civil or criminal action] so as to
be able to work with a complete record and avoid duplicative
investigation.”20
If a disciplinary authority decides to rule on a grievance arising from a
purportedly misleading advertisement involving unsettled scientific issues,
then it is critical for decision-makers to remember the constitutional
principles that have emerged from both the lawyer advertising cases and
the law of defamation. The power to impose lawyer discipline is limited
by the precedent in each of those areas.
The lawyer advertising cases hold that while inherently misleading
16
See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.4 (3d
ed. Supp. 2009) (indicating that in most states the privilege does not turn on good faith or good cause).
17
See ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 1 (2011) (“Self-regulation of
the legal profession requires that members of the profession initiate disciplinary investigation when
they know of a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct.”).
18
See Vincent R. Johnson, Legal Malpractice Litigation and the Duty to Report Misconduct, 1
ST. MARY’S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS 40, 82–87 (2011) (discussing public policy
considerations in favor of deferred reporting of misconduct during pending litigation).
19
See John Caher, Judicial Ethics Committee Punts on Query over Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. L.J.,
Jan. 13, 2012, at 1 (reporting that the New York Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics decided to
sidestep the question of whether a judge can refuse to perform same-sex marriages on religious grounds
because the question “raises serious legal issues . . . [which] must be raised and addressed by persons
with standing in the appropriate legal venue”).
20
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS
AND MATERIALS 58 (10th ed. 2008).
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statements can be banned, communications that are only potentially
misleading must be addressed by less restrictive means, such as additional
disclosure requirements.21 The Constitution favors more speech, not less.22
The mere fact someone might misunderstand an advertisement is not
enough to justify the imposition of discipline.
The defamation cases make clear that speech about an issue of public
concern is protected by the First Amendment, unless it includes, expressly
or implicitly, a provably false assertion of fact. Statements of opinion that
do not imply false facts cannot give rise to liability.23 In this regard it may
be noted that the first part of the statement that is the focus of the D.C.
complaint appears to be indisputably true: the study that linked
mountaintop mining to birth defects “failed to account for consanquinity
[sic].”24 The second part of the statement—that consanguinity is “one of
the most prominent sources of birth defects”25—might be deemed to be not
provably false (depending on the state of relevant science) or might simply
be a matter of opinion as to the meaning of conflicting facts.
One fair interpretation of the advertisement at issue is that the lawyers
were offering to represent coal companies by making whatever arguments
were supported by the law and facts. This line of analysis would
presumably insulate lawyers from liability for alleged misconduct.
Lawyers ordinarily have a legal privilege to represent their clients even
when their doing so is disadvantageous to other persons.26
In one recent case, the Supreme Court of South Carolina dismissed

21

The Supreme Court explained that:
[W]hen the particular content or method of the advertising suggests that it is
inherently misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such
advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose appropriate restrictions.
Misleading advertising may be prohibited entirely. But the States may not place
an absolute prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading
information . . . .

In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); accord In re Anonymous Member of S.C. Bar, 684 S.E.2d 560,
564 (S.C. 2009) (per curiam).
22
See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977) (“Although, of course, the bar retains
the power to correct omissions that have the effect of presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred
remedy is more disclosure, rather than less.”).
23
Cf. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990) (concluding that statements of
opinion could support an action for defamation because they were “sufficiently factual to be susceptible
of being proved true or false”).
24
Complaint, supra note 1, at 1, 3.
25
Id. at 1.
26
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Schrock, 142 P.3d 1062, 1071–72 (Or. 2006) (en banc) (recognizing a
privilege sufficient to defeat a claim against a lawyer for aiding and abetting a client’s breach of
fiduciary duty); Maynard v. Caballero, 752 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding that the
lawyer’s privilege to represent his client defeated an action for tortious interference).
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27

grievance charges based on misleading advertising. The court found that
an advertisement stating variously that a lawyer would “work to protect”
and would “protect” injured employees from employer retaliation was not
“misleading in that it created the false impression that by retaining [the
attorney] an injured employee would not lose his or her job by filing a
worker’s compensation claim.”28 As the court explained, “[t]his broad
statement . . . was merely a statement of [the attorney’s] role as an
advocate on behalf of a client. Within this advocacy role, [the attorney]
appeared to convey that he would use whatever means, including statutory
remedies, which were available to guard against a client’s loss of
employment.”29
In his complaint, the Charlotte School of Law professor argued that the
lawyers’ “misleading statement regarding consanguinity . . . is rooted in
the harmful stereotype that Appalachian communities are more inbred than
communities elsewhere in the country.”30 He asserts that “[i]t is sound
policy for the Bar to punish the use of misleading stereotypes in attorney
advertising.”31 Whether this is true, as a general rule, is certainly open to
question.
First, determining whether a statement is rooted in a harmful
stereotype would often require a disciplinary committee to speculate, and it
might invite punishment of unpopular speech. The advertisement that gave
rise to the D.C. complaint did not expressly invoke any stereotype; it
simply said that consanguinity was a relevant issue in birth defect cases.32
Second, some stereotypes are merely expressions of opinion and to that
extent should be constitutionally protected.33 It seems doubtful that a
27

In re Anonymous Member of South Carolina Bar, 684 S.E.2d at 566.
Id. at 561, 565.
29
Id. at 565.
30
Complaint, supra note 1, at 8.
31
Id.
32
In response to complaints about the advertisement, Crowell & Moring issued the following
statement:
28

Consanguinity is one of a number of commonly addressed issues in studies of
this type, regardless of geography. Scientists address this consideration regularly
because it can matter to scientific conclusions, and do so regardless of locale.
We did not raise this issue with particular reference to any region, and we did not
mean to imply any such thing. That said, we apologize for any offense
taken . . . .
Ken Ward, Jr., Mountaintop Removal and Birth Defects: Just What Are the Coal Industry’s Lawyers
Talking
About?,
CHARLESTON
GAZETTE
(July
11,
2011),
http://blogs.wvgazette.com/coaltattoo/2011/07/11/mountaintop-removal-and-birth-defects-just-whatare-the-coal-industrys-lawyers-talking-about/.
33
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 24 (1990). Although the court declined to enact a
“so-called opinion privilege” it stated that “protection for statements of pure opinion is dictated by
existing First Amendment doctrine” and, as such, “‘full constitutional protection’ extends to any
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consumer lawyer should be disciplined for saying that insurance
companies or multi-national corporations are greedy and victimize
ordinary persons. This is true even if that opinion is rooted in offensive
and inaccurate stereotypes.
Third, employing lawyer discipline to banish offensive stereotyping
might divert attention away from the relevant constitutional inquiry. The
question, framed in light of the First Amendment, is not whether an
utterance reflects bad taste or is found by others to be offensive, but
whether the statement is false. Unless the statement is provably false, it
enjoys an important degree of constitutional protection.
Finally, while lawyers must respect the rights of third persons, they
also have an obligation to zealously represent their clients in litigation.34
Thus, relevant provisions in lawyer ethics codes impose discipline for
disrespect of the rights of third persons only if a lawyer, in representing a
client uses “means that have no substantial purpose other than to
embarrass, delay, or burden a third person.”35 Imposing discipline based
on perceived stereotyping would render meaningless this carefully drawn
language, which is now part of the law of a multitude of jurisdictions.36
Just a few decades ago, an American Bar Association committee
headed by former Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark37 declared the state
of lawyer discipline in the United States to be scandalously deficient.38
During the intervening years, the field of lawyer discipline has been greatly
improved.39 Yet, today, in every jurisdiction, the process for policing the
legal profession labors under the realities of limited resources and the need
for public confidence in the decisions made.
It would be unwise for disciplinary authorities to venture into the
unmapped territory of disputed scientific questions or to stray from wellestablished constitutional principles in a misguided effort to effectively
discipline attorneys. It would also be imprudent for the relevant authorities
to allow grievances to be effectively used as tactical weapons incidental to
statement relating to matters of public concern ‘that cannot ‘reasonably [be] interpreted as stating
actual facts’ about an individual.’” Id.
34
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE (2006) (“As advocate, a lawyer zealously
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”).
35
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2011) (emphasis added).
36
See, e.g., CONN. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2012) (adopting the text of Model Rule
of Professional Conduct R. 4.4(a)); DEL. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(a) (2010) (same),
available at http://courts.delaware.gov/rules/DLRPCFebruary2010.pdf.
37
Tom C. Clark, OYEZ (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.oyez.org/justices/tom_c_clark.
38
See A.B.A. SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS
AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 1 (1970) (“After three years of studying
lawyer discipline throughout the country, this Committee must report the existence of a scandalous
situation that requires the immediate attention of the profession.”).
39
See Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy in the Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J.
LEGAL PROF. 33, 49–52 (2005) (discussing efforts to modernize lawyer discipline).
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heated civil litigation. These various considerations require disciplinary
authorities to exercise restraint and judgment in interpreting and enforcing
the malleable provisions of lawyer ethics codes.

